By Harry Hallett

Introduction

Geopolitics in the decades following World War II focused on the concept of decolonization and the dismantlement of Western European and Japanese empires established before World War I, a process that began between the wars.[1] Another focus was the prevention of the establishment of new imperial colonies by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A fact often omitted from western histories is that southern Africa was also significantly affected by the Cold War. The interrelationships involved were very complicated, and the full extent of the visitation of the Cold War upon the region has only recently come to light.[2]

Historians David Birmingham and Elizabeth Schmidt, who have written on the period of African history that encompasses the years during and after the Cold War, and John Gaddis and Odd Westad, who have written on the Cold War and its influence on Africa, agree that African decolonization and the Cold War were global processes that overlapped and intertwined in the mid to late 20th Century CE.[3] The four also agree that the Cold War involvement in southern Africa by the United States (US), the USSR, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and their respective allies lengthened the processes of decolonization and post-colonial nation-building, and made those progressions more violent in some places.

It is the degree(s) to which this affected individual African states where historians such as Birmingham, Schmidt, Gaddis, and Westad differ. For example, Cold War historians, historians of Africa, and historians who study both the Cold War and southern Africa vary in their opinions as to what extent Cold War interventions conducted by non-African actors affected southern Africa’s decolonization and post-colonial independence. For this analysis, the focus of this paper will be the nation of Angola during its War for Independence (1961-1974) and its subsequent post-colonial civil war (1975-2002).

The question is not why do these historians disagree. The question is since they are studying the same country during the same period in history, what is it that leads them to the differences in their estimations of the results of foreign interventions in Angola during the Cold War? This analysis will show that the arguments come principally from differences in how they approach the study of their areas of historical expertise and how they use the sources they consult in their research.

Historical Context

Any understanding of how foreign interventions affected Angola is incomplete without looking at the results of European power politics, economic exploitation, and oppression that led to the disadvantages Angolans and their society faced after colonial rule. In the 15th Century CE, Portugal, hoping to enter the profitable slave trade, was the first European nation to claim land in sub-Sharan Africa. The territory they established their rule over became present-day Angola. By the late 19th Century CE, empires such as those of Belgium, France, The United Kingdom, Italy, and Portugal were making conflicting claims for African lands, some of which turned bloody, and they met in Berlin, Germany, to settle these territorial disputes. The Berlin Act of 1885 ceded Angola to Portugal which retained control of the territory for the next one hundred years. Like many European nations seeking to establish empires in Africa, Portuguese officials used Angolans as slave labor to harvest coffee and rubber, and to extract diamonds and other precious resources such as bauxite, iron, and oil.

In the 1950s, three competing Angolan rebel groups formed to fight for independence from Portugal. They would also compete with one another for political dominance both during the Angolan War for Independence (1961-1974) and the Angolan Civil War (1975-2002). The first group established was the Movimento Popular de Libertaçäo de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) or MPLA. Birthed in 1956 from the merging of the Partido Comunista Angolano (Angolan Communist Party) and the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (Party of the United Struggle for African in Angola) the group was led by Agostinho Neto and promoted Marxist ideology. The MPLA was supported by the USSR and found its most significant domestic support from the Mbundu peoples of northeastern and central Angola as well as western-educated Angolans and those of mixed-race living in the capital city of Luanda. The second group to form was the Frente Nacional para a Libertaçäo de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) or FNLA. Led by Holden Roberto and promoting a nativist nationalism, the FNLA received support from the US and enjoyed considerable domestic support among the Bakongo peoples of northwestern Angola. The third group, led by Jonas Savimbi and promoting a sort of hybrid between Marxism and nativist nationalism was the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) or UNITA. Supported by the PRC, UNITA also received considerable domestic support from the Ovimbundu peoples of central and southern Angola.

The Portuguese fought the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA to maintain its colony until 1975. The year prior, in 1974, a political coup in Portugal brought to power a government that had little interest in continuing a decade-long war with Angolan nationalist movements and which was repulsed by the ever-increasing expenses of maintaining its empire.[4] Portugal chose to grant Angolan independence. Under the Alvor Agreement of 1975, Portugal relinquished all legal, political, and administrative claims in Angola.[5] The agreement also established a transition government comprised of a coalition between the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA and recognizing all three as being “the sole legitimate representative of the people of Angola,” and setting November 11th of that year as the official date of independence.[6] Though all of the signatories agreed to a ceasefire, when the agreed-upon day of independence came, Portugal’s High Commissioner for Angola stood outside of the Governor’s Mansion and, to the sounds of battle in the background, read a simple statement handing sovereignty over to the “Angolan people.” No Angolans were present to hear his comments or to raise an Angolan flag. A civil war had broken out for control of the new state.

Angola attracted a great deal of economic and political interest from other nations during the Cold War. The United States, England, Belgium, France, and West Germany invested considerable sums of money in obtaining and exporting Angolan coffee, industrial diamonds, uranium, and oil. Additionally, the Republic of Zaire bordered on the Northeast and the Republic of South Africa–occupied Namibia adjoined it on the South.[7] Zaire and South Africa were determined to install a regime in Angola that was favorable to only one of them.[8] Consequently, at the same moment that Portugal was relinquishing sovereignty of Angola, the MPLA defended the capital city of Luanda against attacks by South African troops supported by UNITA fighters to the south and FNLA troops backed by Zairean infantry to the north.[9] The MPLA needed help, and it was military assistance provided by troops from the Republic of Cuba that converted Angola into a Cold War battleground. From 1975 until the Cold War’s end other foreign actors such as the Republic of Zambia, the Democratic Peoples Republic of [North] Korea (DPRK), and the [East] German Democratic Republic (DDR) inserted themselves into Angola’s civil war. The inclusion of this diverse arrangement of nations resulted in an odd array of rather unusual bedfellows. For example, because the US-backed UNITA targeted MPLA personnel, government facilities, and foreign business interests, the Cubans found themselves in the odd position of supporting a Marxist government while protecting an oil complex partly owned by the US-owned Chevron Oil Company.[10]

Support for Zaire, South Africa, and the Angolan factions from Cold War actors such as the US and USSR waxed and waned with the winds of world politics.[11] In 1988, the US brokered an agreement that resulted in the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Angola. By 1991 all non-Angolan military forces were gone, and in 1992 the FNLA ceased guerrilla actions becoming a strictly political party. Also, in 1992, the nation held its first multi-party governmental elections. Still, the civil war continued until 2002 and only ended with the death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, and the signing of a peace agreement between the MPLA and UNITA.[12] The legacies of Angola’s colonial period and the co-opting of its post-colonial civil war by the US, Zaire, the USSR, and others left the nation politically weak and economically fragile with much of its most productive farmlands littered with landmines. Only Angola’s vast oil and diamond resources and foreign relationships begun during the foreign interventions have enabled it to avoid total economic ruin.

From the inside looking out: The historian of Africa’s perspective

Historians of Africa who have written on Angola’s history during the Cold War have focused on the effects of foreign nations’ interventions. Scholars understand that nations act in ways that place national interests first. For example, one premise often found in Angolan history of that period is that Cuba’s presence in Angola was due to opportunistic Cuban policies that overrode any Communist principle of socialist solidarity.

Dr. Elizabeth Schmidt is an expert in both Cold War history and the history of southern Africa. In Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror, she acknowledges that the Angolan factions derived some direct benefit from foreign interventions. However, using documents from the United Nations (UN), the US, and the USSR, commentaries by journalists and diplomats, and her own experiences in southern Africa: Schmidt argues that the increased militarization of their conflicts with each other and the direct involvement of foreign soldiers was categorically damaging to civilian populations, and their negative impacts deepened the longer that it went on. Schmidt believes that it was not just militarism that was unhelpful, but that “Even international humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts were marred by conflicting interests that sometimes hurt the people they were intended to assist.”[13]

In a 2014 lecture given at the US Naval Academy titled “Foreign Intervention in Africa: The Cold War Legacy in Contemporary Africa,” Schmidt stated that foreign intervention in newly independent sub-Saharan African states played on local dynamics, worsened tensions, and made internal conflicts more lethal.[14] She also asserts that the US, the USSR, Cuba, and others essentially stole Angola’s decolonization and nation-building processes for their economic and political interests to the extent that Angola became a battleground of not only the remnants of imperialist economic and political influences but also of an East-West ideological proxy war. Schmidt does clarify that her contention is not that only interventions by non-African states added to Angola’s troubles. She recognizes the contributions, both good and bad, of neighboring states and the regional, and continental organizations which supported opposing sides in Angola’s civil war.[15] Schmidt adds that it was not until the demise of Soviet communism that Angola became strategically less essential to the western powers who then left it to founder with the remnants of foreign military, political, and economic intrusion.[16]

Dr. David Birmingham is an expert in the histories of Portugal, southern Africa, and Angola. In Empire in Africa: Angola and its Neighbors, he uses books by Portuguese and Angolan writers contemporary to the events, the writings of various historians of Africa, and his personal experiences in Angola during the period to describe in detail how nation-building in Angola presented the national government with a significant number of unique difficulties. Birmingham explained that Angola had to deal with a war for dominance among the three factions who were supposed to be sharing power, a secessionist guerrilla movement in the oil-rich Cabinda province, South African troops in the south, and Zairean soldiers in the north. Additionally, he stated that European business interests in the country (which the nation had to depend on for crucial revenues) were seeking assurances and guarantees of protection and continued operation, and the departure of the Portuguese left the country without a smoothly functioning national infrastructure or governmental bureaucracy.

Birmingham argued that dealing with those problems while coming to grips with newly won independence and trying to establish a new state would tax any peoples. He stated that, after thirteen years of fighting Portugal for independence, each of the three homegrown independence factions called for assistance from their existing domestic and foreign allies in bids to establish supremacy. Decisions that led to a proxy war between the Cold War powers which, as Birmingham put it, “replaced Vietnam as a focal point of … confrontation.” Birmingham also wrote that foreign intervention in Angola, whether by its African neighbors or by non-African states, “brought together an unholy alliance of enemies from the Congo River to the Cape of Good Hope.”[17] Furthermore, in A Short History of Modern Angola, he criticizes the factions’ acceptance of new international partners. He writes that “The birth-pangs of the newly independent nation of Angola were protracted and bloody, compounded by the presence of a multiplicity of midwives: Congolese, Russian, Cuban, South African, and American.”[18]

Schmidt and Birmingham are very critical of foreign intercession in Angola during the Cold War, claiming that such involvement failed utterly to aid in the improvement of the political, economic, and military situation in Angola thereby hindering the revolutionary process.[19] Their perspective, seen through the lens of their African expertise, is that foreign intervention only served to exacerbate economic and political instability that already existed in Angola and to prolong social, economic, and political problems that still required resolution after the interventionist powers withdrew their support at the end of the Cold War.

From the outside looking in: The Cold War historian’s perspective

Cold War historians who have studied Angola have looked at the effects of foreign nations’ interventions from a global historical perspective with a view to the overall global benefits of such intervention. Simply put, scholars such as Odd Westad and John Gaddis claim that good came from the bad that occurred in Angola. For example, one thought present in these men’s writings is that Angolan independence and the resultant increase in Communist activities contributed to the decisions of the independent white governments of South Africa and Rhodesia to become further entrenched in their policies of racial segregation and oppression while simultaneously expending resources outside of their borders to oppose communism and to destabilize their African neighbors. These motions intensified internal dissent in those countries from both African nationalists and white settlers while bringing international scorn on their governments and helping to accelerate black emancipation from white-minority rule in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.[20]

In The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Dr. Odd Westad, an expert in Cold War and East Asian history, states that his intention is to not “write a book about the Cold War in the Third World from a superpower perspective only.”[21] Using official documentation from the US, the USSR, the UN, the writings of various other Cold War experts in many fields, commentaries by journalists and academics contemporary to the period, and his personal experiences in Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s, he makes the argument that it was the 1974 coup in Portugal, rather than any actions by the Angolan independence movements, which led directly to independence for Angola.[22] Westad is also convinced that the USSR’s continued involvement in Angola was one of the key factors contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Russian empire. Interventions in countries such as Angola severely strained the Soviet economy to the point that the USSR was unable to respond to pressures placed upon the government by the Soviet people.[23]

In an International Security article titled “Containment: Its Past and Future,” Dr. John Gaddis, an expert on Cold War history who focuses on US and USSR foreign policy, noted that, in his estimation, many Africans saw the Soviets instead of the Americans as being “inheritors of the imperialist tradition” in Africa.[24] A point of view which he thinks benefited Angola when a shift in US policy aligned the US with the cause of black majority rule in southern Africa.[25] In The Cold War: A New History, Gaddis uses official documents from the UN, the US, and the USSR, the writings of various Cold War experts in many fields, and commentaries by journalists and academics contemporary to the period to support his contention that the USSR’s involvement in Angola came about for one reason: the need to honor publicly made promises to support Cuba’s active participation in Angola’s civil war. Adding that the USSR “gained little from the experience” either politically or economically.[26] Gaddis agrees with Westad’s claim regarding Soviet intervention in Angola. Moreover, it becomes evident that, seen through the global lens of Westad’s and Gaddis’ Cold War expertise, they see the foreign interventions as benefiting Angola over the short term while benefiting the world, though not necessarily Angola, over the long term.

Seeing with the Same Eyes: The Shared Perspective

Birmingham, Gaddis, Schmidt, and Westad all agree that alliances with Cold War belligerents had the effect of upsetting the asymmetry that usually develops in the relationship between governments and rebels. Under more normal circumstances, such as the people of Angola saw during the War for Independence, the state is militarily superior to rebels. Therefore, alliances with mighty external powers have the effect of benefitting rebels more because such alliances bring the rebels to a level which allows the mounting of a sufficient military challenge against a stronger state via robust insurgency. However, as has been shown, Angola during its civil war was anything but a typical state.

These four historians agree that the interventions in Angola of the US, Cuba, South Africa, the USSR, and their respective allies not only made post-colonial nation-building require more extended periods of time and result in higher levels of chaos and violence, but that those interventions also played a part in extending the life of the Cold War. Westad pointed out in “The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms,” published in a 2000 issue of Diplomatic History, that were it not for the newly decolonized and decolonizing states of Africa and elsewhere, it is likely that the Cold War “would have petered out sometime in the 1960s.”[27] Instead, the Cold War drew out because of expansion into areas where the war’s ideological contrast was entirely irrelevant to the majority of the people living there. It was not until after the Cold War that interventions in Angola by foreign governments ceased, or at least dramatically decreased, to the point where it was possible to establish a viable peace and begin real nation-building. Still, as Birmingham attests, “the colonial legacy which they inherited was a deeply scarred one.”[28] Such a sentiment is one with which the Schmidt, Westad, and Gaddis would likely agree.

Conclusion

Angola along with having a rich and diverse culture possesses extensive petroleum reserves, fertile agricultural land, and valuable diamond and other resources which make it one of the wealthiest countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, while Angola has been able to maintain some measure of economic, political, and military stability since 2001, it cannot be overemphasized that few countries in the world have experienced the length and degree of violent conflict that Angola has. Though rich in natural resources it was also, at the end of its civil war, economically and politically devastated. Among its long-term troubles are high inflation, the societal effects of the death and displacement of millions, conflicts over land ownership, a population that is still doubtful of peace and democracy, and a crisis from thousands of unexploded landmines left by the warring factions that prevent millions of acres of fertile farmland from being used. Additionally, while external intervention has diminished, in the competition for oil, diamonds, and other precious resources, outside corporate interests such as Chevron oil and DeBeers diamonds continue to play a significant and decisive role in Angola.

This analysis establishes the fact that the Cold War had a transformative impact on the way and the speed at which Angolan independence and nation-building progressed. As evidenced here, through the Cold War machinations of the East and West powers, the processes of decolonization and nation-building in Angola were hindered and delayed. Historians such as Westad and Gaddis who state that such intrigues were beneficial to the process in Africa because of, among other things, the striking decline of irregular wars such as the Angolan Civil War following the end of the Cold War and the expansion of Angola’s oil industry, making it Africa’s second-largest petroleum producer, see gains that benefit Angola and are helping in its slow recovery from the long years of war. However, as has also been shown here, historians such as Schmidt and Birmingham who assert that these same conditions lengthened and made the process much more violent, leaving the country still striving to tackle the physical, social, and political legacy of colonization and its 27-year post-colonial civil war see little that Angola has gained and much that it has lost. Additionally, this report answers the question of what leads historians studying Cold War Angola to differ in their estimations of the effects of foreign interventions in Angola during that time, showing that both agreement and argument comes chiefly from differences in how they approach the study of their specific areas of historical expertise and how they interpret the sources they consult in their research.

Still, Birmingham sees evidence of hope in Angola. Recounting in 2007 an experience that he had on a 2003 trip to Angola, he writes that the “most unexpected aspect of postwar Angola … is the vibrancy of the free press. Every Saturday the streets of the cidade asfalta (asphalt city) are alive with runners selling no less than five titles.”[29] In 2015, Birmingham expressed optimism that “the energy and inventiveness” of Angola’s women would revive that nation’s economy because “the robust nature of female enterprise in Angola crossed ethnic boundaries and was as dynamic among the Kongo of the north as among the Ovimbundu of the south.”[30]

Endnotes

1. Geopolitics is the study of how human geography and physical geography effects politics and international relations.

2. The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tensions between the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The People’s Republic of China and their respective allies that lasted from the end of European hostilities in World War II in 1945 (some scholars say it began in 1946 or 1947) until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The term was first used to describe the social and political implications of possessing atomic weapons in a 1945 essay by the English author George Orwell titled “You and the Atomic Bomb.”

3. Dr. David Birmingham is Emeritus Professor of Modern History at the University of Kent at Canterbury (UK), Dr. Elizabeth Schmidt is Professor of African History at Loyola University, Dr. John Gaddis is the Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University, and Dr. Odd Westad is the S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations at Harvard University.

4. The coup, and the revolution that it sparked in Portugal, was dubbed Revolução dos Cravos (Revolution of the Carnations or the Carnation Revolution) because, when the people heard the news and took to the streets in celebration, they saw carnations on the uniforms or in the rifle muzzles of any military personnel they met.

5. For the full text of the Alvor Agreement see “The Angola Agreement.” In Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1974-1975, edited by Colin Legum, (Vol. 7. New York: Africana Publishing House, 1975), C221-226. Also, Alvor and Beyond: Political Trends and Legal Issues in Angola, 34-39.

6. United Nations. Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship, and Decolonization. Developments in Angola, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe. (4th ed. Vol. 2. New York: Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship, and Decolonization, 1975), 17.

7. The Republic of Zaire (Zah-eer) had been part of the Belgian empire and was known as the Belgian Congo prior to 1960. It has been known as the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1997. While Zaire had its eye on Northern Angola’s natural resources, the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia independently established policies for actively working toward the destabilization of not only Angola, but of black governments in all neighboring countries.

8. Zaire’s President, Mobutu Sese Seko, hoped to use his support of the FNLA to enable him to annex the oil-rich Bakongo areas of Northern Angola. For more on Zairean intervention in Angola see “Involvement in the Angolan Civil War,” In Tim Merrill and Sandra W. Meditz’s. Zaire: A Country Study, 55-56. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1994.

9. South Africa Defense Forces invaded Angola in Operation Savannah under the guise of pursuing rebels of the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) who had fled into Angola. Its real mission was to support FNLA and UNITA militias in their fight against MPLA troops who had been armed and trained by the USSR and who were engaged in a major offensive against the FNLA and UNITA. For more on South African intervention in Angola see Ian Liebenberg, Jorge Risquet, and Vladimir Shubin’s book A Far-Away War: Angola 1975-1989. Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2015, and Robin Hallett’s “The South African Intervention in Angola 1975-76.” African Affairs 77, no. 308 (1978): 347-86.

10. Brooke, James. “Cuba’s Strange Mission in Angola.” The New York Times Magazine (New York, NY, February 1, 1987).

11. The Peoples Republic of China supported both the FNLA and UNITA as well as other liberation movements in sub-Saharan Africa in opposition to USSR backed governments after the Sino-Soviet split of 1960. For more information on the split, see Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, also Valery Kudryavtsev’s “Problems and Judgments: Real and Fictitious Difficulties.” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, no. 20 (November 20, 1967): 21-23, and Jeremy Friedman’s Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016.

12. Officially, Jonas Savimbi died in combat against Angolan Army troops. But there are many who charge that he was assassinated during combat by agents of a Western power.

13. Schmidt, Elizabeth. Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 2.

14. Schmidt, Elizabeth. “Foreign Intervention in Africa: The Cold War Legacy in Contemporary Africa.” Lecture, U.S. Naval Academy Center for Regional Studies, Annapolis, MD, March 25, 2014.

15. Organizations such as Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) or FLEC, Suidwes-Afrikaanse Volk-Organisasie (South West African People’s Organization) or SWAPO, the Organisation de l’unité Africaine (Organization of African Unity) or OAU, and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union or ZAPU.

16. Schmidt. “Cold War Legacy in Contemporary Africa.”

17. Birmingham, David. Empire in Africa: Angola and Its Neighbors. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 106.

18. Birmingham, David. A Short History of Modern Angola. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 81.

19. For more on this, see Elizabeth Schmidt, “Conflict in Africa: The Historical Roots of Current Problems.” American Historical Association. July 26, 2016, also David Birmingham, “Africa: Re-Sourcing History.” Lecture, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., November 14, 2011, and Jeremi Suri, “The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakenings: Historical Intersections.” Cold War History 6, no. 3 (2006): 353-63.

20. For more on this, see Sue Onslow, Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation. London: Routledge, 2012, and Fawcett, Louise L’Estrange, and Yazid Yusuf Sayigh. The Third World Beyond the Cold War: Continuity and Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

21. Westad. Odd. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 2.

22. Westad. Global Cold War, 220.

23. Westad. 402.

24. Gaddis, John. “Containment: Its Past and Future.” International Security 5, no. 4 (1981), 86.

25. Gaddis, John. “The Old World Order.” New York Times (New York, NY, March 21, 1999).

26. Gaddis, John. The Cold War: A New History. (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 179.

27. Westad, Odd. “The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms.” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (2000): 563.

28. Birmingham. A Short History, 119.

29. Birmingham. Empire in Africa, 148.

30. Birmingham. A Short History, 122.

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——. “The Old World Order.” New York Times, Books, (March 21, 1999).
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——. “The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms.” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (2000): 551-65. doi:10.1111/0145-2096.00236.

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——. A Short History of Modern Angola. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

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——. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National
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Schmidt, Elizabeth. “Foreign Intervention in Africa: The Cold War Legacy in Contemporary Africa.” Lecture, U.S. Naval Academy Center for Regional Studies, Annapolis, March 25, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXrTwqmbAXw.

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